



# **A fiscus for better economic and social development in South Africa**

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# A fiscus for better economic and social development in South Africa

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## Abstract

After showing that the bulk of government expenditure is unproductive, we consider the impact of an alternative fiscal policy mix in South Africa. The alternative suggests freezing the real government wage bill for five years and using the savings generated by this decision to increase spending on a specific, productive and wealth-creative expenditure item, aggregate investments. By indirectly contributing to greater levels of investments we show how government can generate better levels of economic performance and social development. To analyse the economic consequences of the suggested fiscal policy mix we use TERM-SA a dynamic, regional computable general equilibrium model of South Africa. We also add additional features to provide more accurate and detailed results. Our results show that a wage freeze can increase both real GDP (5.9%) and employment (456,00 jobs) in the long-term.

JEL Classification: C68, H31, E16, L91, R10

Keywords: Computable general equilibrium models, households, social accounting matrix, regional economics, policy modelling

## 1 Background and Literature Review

### 1.1 Social Development at the Cost of Economic Growth

In an early study on South Africa's economic history, Terreblanche (2002) argued that the fiscal policy strategy government used during the initial period of democracy was not appropriate for social development. During the period 1994/95 to 2007/08, the South African government stabilized expenditure and used additional revenue to reduce the budget deficit and the debt-burden; a process which many would consider prudent fiscal management. In fact, the debt burden was reduced from 48.3% in 1994/95 to only 26.0% in 2007/08

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(Treasury, 2018). During this period spending on social development<sup>1</sup> declined from 55% in 1994/95 to only 48% in 2007/08, expressed as a percentage of total expenditure (Treasury, 2018). Government's spending on wealth-creative policies, i.e. spending on investments<sup>2</sup>, was unfortunately also low. From 1994/95 to 2007/08 the South African government spent on average 5.3% of their total budget on investments (National Treasury, 2018). There was a slight increase in the annual average rate from 2008/09 to 2017/18 when spending on investments averaged 7.8% of total spending. Economic growth between 1994/95 and 2007/08 averaged 3.54% annually and fell to an average of 1.69% between 2008/09 and 2017/18.

There is consensus in literature that the reluctance of African countries to spend sufficiently on investments is an impediment to growth. In the South African context, Fedderke, Perkins and Luiz (2006) explain that an unwillingness to spend sufficiently on investments helps to explain the decline in economic activity since 1970. Du Plessis and Smit (2006) substantiate these findings. After the global financial crisis of 2008, the government rapidly increased spending, a common fiscal response to external shocks (Alm & Abel, 2010). However, whilst spending on social development increased, spending on investments decreased from a high of 8.4% in 2008/09 to 6.6% in 2017/18. Jooste, Liu and Naraidoo (2013) support fiscal expansion but conclude that fiscal policy can only be used to stimulate short-term consumption and output, and that South Africa's government should be weary not to over-extend the duration of stimulus. However, spending on social development increased from 48.0% in 2008/09 to 51.7% in 2017/18 (Treasury, 2018). Increases in spending on social development during a time when revenue collections were low, resulted in substantial budget deficits and an increase in debt levels from 31.5% in 2008/09 to 53.5% in 2017/18. Because of the expansionary fiscal scheme Ocran (2011) and Inchauste, Lustig, Maboshe, Purfield and Woolard (2015) conclude that social development has indeed now occurred in SA. In fact, by using progressive taxes and spending on wealth redistributive policies, i.e. increasing governments wage bill and spending on transfers, South Africa has achieved the greatest reduction in poverty and income inequality among emerging market countries (Inchauste, et al., 2015). However, even with these improvements SA is still among those countries with the highest levels of income inequality.

Inchauste et al. (2015) note that because of the lack of economic growth, high fiscal deficits and the rising cost of debt, further social development will not be possible via redistributive policies. The South African government has overextended the period of stimulus, as Jooste et al. (2013) warned against. To continue with social development, the South African government needs to improve public service, as well as grow the economy (Inchauste, et al., 2015). Higher eco-

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<sup>1</sup>Using an economic classification of government expenditure, we refer to spending on social development as that part of government expenditure which is spent on the compensation of civil servants and transfers made to the poor.

<sup>2</sup>The term "investments" is used as a collective term to describe spending on capital assets and the term includes all types of tangible and non-tangible assets. These include, but are not limited to: property, infrastructure, equipment, and software.

conomic growth however, seems unlikely with SA's current redistributive policies that focus on increasing spending, rather than focusing on increasing production through wealth creative policies. The South African government's current fiscal policy strategy closely replicates the structurally constrained nature of South Africa's economy (Akanbi, 2013).

In a structurally constrained economy like South Africa's, domestic production is less than domestic demand. As a result, economic activity is driven by expenditure and not production. Under these circumstances an economy fails to achieve appropriate levels of income distribution (Akanbi, 2013); commonly referred to as the poverty trap. By using an Engle Granger two-step estimation technique, Akanbi (2013) shows that under the current supply constraints in SA, fiscal policy (especially those policies focusing on expenditure) would not be effective at stabilising the economy. Akanbi (2013) calls for a better fiscal policy mix, that would first address the structural supply constraints in the South African economy. Many of his suggestions can be considered wealth creative policies which can lead to sustained, inclusive economic growth. Amongst others, he emphasises the need for substantial increases in investments and the successful development of skills. Developing skills can lead to an increase in labour productivity. Mabugu, Robichaud, Masionnave and Chitiga (2013) use an intertemporal CGE model to draw a similar conclusion; increasing current expenditure will not have a lasting impact on economic activity. Jooste et al. (2013) supports this conclusion and further concludes that wealth creative policies will also increase the overall debt levels of SA. Financing the expansion with tax increases will help to reduce the debt burden, but it will also dampen the initial economic benefits. Mabugu et al. (2013) show that the best fiscal policy tool the South African government can use, is to increase investments. This will ensure sustainable economic growth. Even when using three types of calibrated DSGE-models, Jooste et al. (2013) show that government investment, i.e. capital expenditure, in isolation, has a greater impact on output than current expenditure or total expenditure. Wealth creative policies also help to reduce the long-term deficit and debt levels (Mabugu, et al., 2013). This is crucial in the current economic environment.

To further explain why government spending cannot lead to ongoing consumption, and output benefits, it is worthwhile to investigate the causality between economic activity (income) and government expenditure in South Africa. Ansari, Gordon and Akuamoah (1997) initially found evidence to support the Keynesian hypothesis that income growth is determined by growth in government expenditure ( $G \rightarrow Y$ ). However, they did not test for cointegration or causality using modern techniques like the Toda-Yamamoto procedure. Modern techniques have distinctive advantages over the residual-based Engle and Granger (1987) techniques employed by Ansari et al. (1997). Also, modern researchers have more recent data to work with, as well as a longer time-series to consider. Ziramba (2008) found bidirectional causality, ruling out the Wagner and Keynesian hypotheses. Finally, Alm and Embaye (2010) use specific techniques to overcome common restrictive modelling assumptions and found evidence to support Wagner's law ( $Y \rightarrow G$ ). One simple explanation for the

mixed results, which also make Wagner’s law more likely, relates to the unproductiveness of the bulk of a government’s expenditure. Had government expenditure been productive, more spending would increase income.

Following an economic classification of consolidated government expenditure, expenditure can be divided into: investments (7.82% of total expenditure between 2008/09 and 2017/18), interest (8.24%), social development (44.34%), and final goods and services (23.14%). By excluding investments, the remaining expenditure items can be considered current expenditure. Investment expenditure, which can be considered productive as it generates long-term income by raising total factor productivity, is only a relatively small share of total spending. Social development includes spending on salaries and wages of civil servants, as well as transfers to households. The largest single expenditure items in the South African government’s budget is the civil servant wage bill, which averaged 38.0% of total expenditure during 2008/09 to 2017/18. However, this portion of government expenditure can also be considered unproductive. To reach this conclusion we used output per worker<sup>3</sup>, a variable commonly used to estimate productiveness, to compare the productiveness of SA’s civil servants to those of civil servants in other countries. Our findings suggest that government employees in SA are the third most unproductive amongst all the countries we analysed<sup>4</sup> although they are the third best compensated among these countries. Transfers to households facilitate the redistribution of income and mainly boost short-term expenditure on goods and services that fulfil the basic needs of households. Although transfers boost short-term consumption and production, they do not directly enhance long-term total factor productivity and therefore fuel the structurally constrained economy Akanbi (2013) referred to. This logic can also be applied to the portion of government expenditure which is spent on final, not intermediary, goods and services, which are used by the South African government to produce various government services. Because investment spending has been such a small share of total expenditure it is easy to assume that most of the government’s debt was not accumulated to acquire assets but rather to pay for current expenditure. For this reason, we can assume that the interest payments the government make are mostly unproductive; these payments do not increase long-term total factor productivity or some other measure of productivity.

For robustness, we also considered the productiveness of government expenditure from a functional classification viewpoint. The three largest expenditure items include education, healthcare and interest. Since 2008/09 to 2017/18 the average spend on these items were 21.1%, 12.4% and 9.4%, respectively; a combined total of 42.9%. In some instances, spending on education and possibly

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<sup>3</sup>Two types of output per worker is considered: output in terms of the size of the economy, and output in terms of total expenditure. International purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars data was sourced from the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2018) and Government Finance Statistics (GFS). Employment data was sourced from the International Labour Organization (ILO).

<sup>4</sup>These countries include: France, Germany, Australia, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, United States of America, China, Turkey, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa.

even healthcare is wealth creative, i.e. they increase total factor productivity. The assumption is that a healthy, educated labour force is more productive, and therefore contribute to long-term economic growth. However, the dismal performance of education (IEA, 2016) and healthcare (New Narrative Ltd., 2018) in SA suggest that spending on these items do not significantly contribute to productivity gains. In terms of the quality of service produced by these two expenditure items South Africa ranked either last, or second last in the world. Unfortunately, due to the poor quality of output in these sectors, South Africa most likely did not realise the potential productivity benefits from these expenditure items.

By concluding that government expenditure in SA is not productive it would be difficult for expenditure to produce sustainable long-term economic growth ( $G \rightarrow Y$ ), although it may be possible to produce growth spurts in the short-term. It is therefore, more reasonable to believe that Wagner's law ( $Y \rightarrow G$ ) is applicable to SA's economy, as suggested by Alm and Embaye (2010). These findings are further substantiated by Odhiambo (2015) who uses an auto-regressive distributed lag model (ARDL) to show that economic growth Granger-causes government spending in the long-term. From this, we can conclude that government's redistributive fiscal policies ( $G \rightarrow Y$ ) that focus on stimulating aggregate demand via social development are not conducive in producing economic growth in the long-term; like the conclusion reached by Jooste et al. (2013).

From the above we conclude that South Africa's (SA) fiscal policy is focused progressively on wealth distribution, and not wealth creation. As a result, social development has been implemented at the cost of sustainable economic growth. Like Akanbi (2013), Fedderke et al. (2006), and Inchauste et al. (2015), we suggest an alternative fiscal policy mix aimed at sustainable economic growth through wealth creative policies, those that focus on investment spending rather than spending on social development. Once wealth has been created, it can then be aggressively redistributed.

## 1.2 A Fiscus for Growth and Job Creation

Research done by Fedderke et al. (2006) illustrated the importance of higher investment spending in SA. They show that investment expenditure can boost economic growth in the long run, both directly and indirectly by raising the marginal product of capital. Du Plessis and Smit (2006) draw a similar conclusion but emphasise the government's role in spending sufficiently on investment. Using an intertemporal CGE-model Mabugu et al. (2013) and Jooste et al. (2013) conclude that greater levels of current expenditure will not have a lasting impact on economic activity. These authors explain that governments who use current expenditures to boost growth in a cycle of fiscal expansion increase the debt burden in the long run. Furthermore, although financing a fiscal expansion with tax increases will help to reduce the debt burden, it will also dampen initial economic benefits. Mabugu et al. (2013) show that the best fiscal policy tool the government can use is to increase investment expenditure. This can ensure sustainable economic growth for South Africa. Jooste et al. (2013) use

three types of calibrated DSGE-models to show that in isolation, government investment has a greater impact on output than current expenditure or total expenditure. Wealth creative policies also help to reduce the long-term deficit and debt levels without forgoing some of the short-term benefits (Mabugu, et al., 2013). This is crucial in South Africa’s current economic environment where the government deficit and debt levels are high.

Calderón et al. (2015) use a panel time series approach to evaluate how investments contribute to output. Specifically, their research considers the impact of power, transport and telecommunications infrastructure and shows that the long-run elasticity of output ranges between 0.07% and 0.10%. By using an investment index their research makes an adjustment to correct for the effect of low productivity and corruption which is often related to government investment projects. Results generated by Calderón et al. (2015) are supported by earlier meta-analysis results generated by Bom and Ligthart (2008), after adjusting for publication bias. It is also important to note that although the research by Calderón et al. (2015) considers 88 different countries, parameter homogeneity tests indicate that there are no significant differences between countries. In fact, using time-series analysis in a vector error-correction mechanisms (VECM) framework Fedderke et al. (2006) found similar results for South Africa: an output elasticity between 0.06% and 0.20%. Using this information, we have adjusted our simulations in a similar fashion by allowing investment increases to occur through a subsidy in the construction industry, rather than simply increasing the government’s investment expenditure. By using a tax cut (subsidy) in this manner we also comply with Akanbi (2013) who noted that tax-related fiscal policies will be more effective in South Africa’s structurally constrained economy.

An alternative fiscal policy mix is needed to facilitate greater levels of inclusive, sustainable economic growth. We suggest, and will later show, that by reducing policies that focus on social development, and using the savings generated from these decisions to increase investment expenditure, the government can create an environment of inclusive, sustainable economic growth.

## 2 TERM-SA Model Theory

TERM-SA is a multi-regional, dynamic, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the South African economy. Its theoretical structure follows that of the bottom-up TERM (The Enormous Regional Model) developed by Horrdige et al. (2005), based on the ORANI model (Dixon, et al., 1982). By representing the South African economy in a bottom-up manner, each region has its own behavioural equations, input-output database and inter-regional trade matrices.

TERM-SA consists of a linearized system of theoretical equations that describe the behaviour of economic participants<sup>5</sup>. Main equations include the

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<sup>5</sup>Theoretical equations are described in detail in Dixon and Rimmer (2002). It is important to note that, regionality does not change the underlying theory of behavioural equations.

regional and inter-regional industry demands for intermediate inputs and primary factors. Typically, in CGE-models like TERM-SA, industries minimise the cost of production for a given level of output subject to a constant elasticity of substitution (*CES*) production function. Industries do this by optimising their mix of labour, capital and intermediary commodities. TERM-SA differs from national, single-region models, in that each commodity is produced by an industry or multiple industries in each region. Although TERM-SA allows regional industries to produce more than one commodity, each regional industry produces mainly one commodity. TERM models like TERM-SA can accommodate high dimensional data by employing various data generating and dimensionality reducing techniques<sup>6</sup>. One of these techniques include the assumption that all regional users who source commodities from different regions, do so according to common properties (Stofberg & van Heerden, 2015).

Investment activity, which is affected by changes in the rates of return, produces sector-specific units of capital in each region (Wittwer, Vere, Jones and Griffith, 2005). As industries decide to source capital from cheaper regions, the investment response allows for regional capital mobility. Varying rates of return cause year-on-year adjustments in capital stock. The national labour supply is determined by demographic factors and is also assumed mobile between regions. This mobility is imperfect and is achieved in policy simulations by allowing for regional differences in real wages in both the short- and long-term. By introducing regional mobility to capital and labour, each region's stock of productive resources reflects regional labour markets and relative rates of return (Wittwer, et al., 2005). In the short-term, wages are assumed sticky on a regional and occupational level to allow initial labour market adjustments to come more from regional employment, than from regional wages. Wittwer, et al. (2005) also explain that regional wages can differ from national wages in the long-term. In doing so, not all long-term adjustments are facilitated by inter-regional labour movements.

The level of output in TERM-SA is based on final user demand, which reflects the prices of commodities and incomes of users. Standard ORANI pricing equations form part of TERM-SA's theoretical core and are based on the premise that pure profits are zero, which imply that markets are competitive. Consistent with South Africa being a small, open economy import prices are exogenously determined (taken from the rest of the world). Export demand is inversely related to its price, denominated in a foreign currency. Like other CGE-models, market clearing conditions are also set up in TERM-SA. Other core equations, often associated with ORANI, describe items such as GDP, aggregate employment and the consumer price index. Final users of commodities include: households, investors, government and exporters. Like standard CGE-models, basic government demand, as well as direct and indirect taxation, are recognised in TERM-SA. Subject to their budget constraints, each regional household-type maximises utility through a Klein-Rubin utility function, as explained in Dixon et al. (1982) and Dixon and Rimmer (2002). Unlike ORANI-based national

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<sup>6</sup>These are explained in more detail in Horridge (2011).

models, with a single government and representative household, TERM-SA has a government and multiple households in each region.

By implementing multiple-household modelling like PHILGEM (Corong & Horridge, 2012) and INDOTERM (Horridge & Wittwer, 2006), TERM-SA is better suited to measure the impact of different economic policies on different types of households in SA. However, unlike these models TERM-SA also allows for a dynamic long-term analysis of the impact of various policies on different household types. Year-on-year dynamics were introduced by Dixon and Rimmer (2002), in their single-region Australian MONASH model, and later adopted for regional models by Wittwer et al. (2005). In TERM-SA, four main dynamic intertemporal links allow year-on-year simulations: capital accumulation, a lagged wage adjustment process, as well as government and foreign debt accumulation. Another important addition that has been added to TERM-SA's core structure is social accounting matrix modelling (SAM-modelling), based on Corong and Horridge (2012). By including this extension, TERM-SA can model the link between producers and the rest of the economy in more detail.

After TERM-SA was successfully set up, it was tested for both real and nominal homogeneity, and passed both these initial tests. We used GEMPACK software, developed by Harrison and Pearson (1996), to solve all the equations that were implemented on the regional input-output (I-O) database of South Africa<sup>7</sup>.

## 2.1 Multiple Household Modelling

Like USAGE-TERM (Wittwer, 2017) TERM-SA allows for multiple household modelling in each region of South Africa. In doing so, TERM-SA is better able to determine the fiscal incidence of policies on different household types<sup>8</sup>. This is an important addition because of the high levels of income inequality in South Africa. In fact, compared to other countries inequality in SA is often among the highest in the world (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez & Zucman, 2018). Any policy changes made to South Africa's economy should therefore be viewed in terms of their impact on the real incomes of different household types. By using 2011 regional Income and Expenditure (IES) data from StatsSA (Statistics South Africa, 2012), which was pre-built by Quantec<sup>9</sup>, TERM-SA allows household modelling for 12 household-types in each region of SA. Households are divided into groups based on their total income and spending, according to IES-data<sup>10</sup>. The first and last decile groups have been split in two ventiles, which ultimately allow us to express South African households from the poorest 5% to the wealthiest 5%.

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<sup>7</sup>Horridge et al. (2005) provide a detailed explanation about the I-O database used by TERM-SA.

<sup>8</sup>TERM-SA distinguishes between 12 household types; the first and last deciles have been split into ventiles.

<sup>9</sup>Quantec is a consultancy providing economic and financial data, country intelligence and quantitative analytical software: <https://www.quantec.co.za/>.

<sup>10</sup>The complete household-split process will be explained in detail in the Chapter 5.

## 2.2 The SAM-extension

Following the example of PHILGEM (Corong & Horridge, 2012), TERM-SA includes additional behavioural equations to allow social accounting matrix modelling (SAM-modelling) of the South African economy. By drawing on supplementary SAM-data TERM-SA can overcome the inability of standard ORANI-style CGE-models and illustrate how factor incomes, tax revenues, and interest on outstanding debt accrue to households, government and enterprises. TERM-SA is therefore, better able to illustrate the link between producers and the rest of the economy. Previous South African SAM-models, like IDCGEM Coetzee, Kwarada, Naude and Swanepoel (1997) and the simplified PEKGEM (Centre of Policy Studies, n.d.), also included some parts of SAM-modelling. However, IDCGEM does not include dynamics like PEKGEM or TERM-SA. Neither PEKGEM or IDCGEM allow multiple-household modelling or include SAM-based behavioural equations for enterprises, and both are based on SA's outdated 1995 SAM-database. These shortcomings have all been addressed by TERM-SA.

The following section will consider some of the important SAM-based behavioural equations that have been added to TERM-SA. A detailed description of each equation, variable and coefficient is available in Corong and Horridge (2012). SAM-related datapoints are illustrated as shaded blocks in Table AA, in Appendix A. Those blocks that are not shaded represent data from TERM-SA's core databases. Each row reflects the income of a specific source, which drives expenditure in the corresponding column. An important addition that was made to TERM-SA is addition of gross operating surplus earned by foreigners, which will impact on net transfers and net foreign liabilities, as well as certain debt dynamics and interest payments on both government debt and foreign liabilities.

## 2.3 Households, Government and the Saving Linkages

Total savings (row 14 in Table AA) in the South African economy can be defined as the savings aggregate between households, government, enterprises, and the rest of the world (*RotW*). This aggregation illustrates the link between household savings and the balance on the current account. Household disposable income can also be calculated by using GDP aggregates, as the product of GDP, government spending (the actual tax amount removed from the productive economy), net-debt servicing costs, and net-transfers to and from the *RotW* (Dixon & Rimmer, 2002). This theoretical expression emphasises the link between the disposable income of households and the government fiscus, but also with the balance of payments. It also helps to illustrate how household savings will be impacted by changes in the fiscus, or an increase in government debt servicing costs which may result because of a downgrade in sovereign credit rating.

Transfers and interest payments from government to households emphasise a further link between the government fiscus and household disposable income.

A final important variable to consider is that of taxes. Direct and indirect taxes are subtracted from a household’s income to derive a disposable income, once again emphasizing the government’s role in a household’s disposable income. Government therefore, plays an important role in the real incomes of households. TERM-SA has been specifically designed to measure the fiscal incidence of different policies or shocks to the South African economy.

It is worthwhile to note that the difference in aggregate savings and investment (column 14 in Table AA) is the balance on the current account (*CAD*). Put differently, this is the net flows between SA and the *RotW*. In the case where savings are less than investments, as is often the case in South Africa that has run an average *CAD* deficit of 3.8% between 2009 and 2018 (South African Reserve Bank, 2018), a country becomes a net borrower from the rest of the world. Foreign debt accumulation is then obtained by adding the *CAD* to the start of year net foreign liabilities (*NFL*). To do this we’ve assumed that all foreign liabilities are repayable in South African Rands, after the necessary exchange adjustments have been made. Finally, interest payments are calculated by applying an interest rate on the total outstanding *NFL* at the beginning of each period. This rate was initially estimated using data from the SARB (South African Reserve Bank, 2018).

## 3 Model Database

### 3.1 The National Input-Out Database

Creating the TERM-SA database starts with the 2011 South African supply-use tables (SUTs) which were sourced from Statistics South Africa (StatsSA). South Africa’s SUTs distinguish between 104 industries of the national, single-region, economy. SUTs first had to be converted to the input-output (I-O) format used by ORANI-G; the standard single-country CGE-model. Whilst SUTs are only published every other year in SA, input-output tables (Statistics South Africa, 2016) are published more frequently. At the onset of this research the 2011 SUTs were the most recent, but since then, a 2015 dataset has been published by Statistics South Africa. We have therefore updated the totals whilst keeping the relative weightings of the older dataset. We were able to do this because the relative weightings remained relatively unchanged. Also, our aim is to evaluate and make policy suggestions based on simulations that measure deviations away from a baseline, the relative size of the values is more important than their absolute values.

After the single-region I-O is created, regional adjustments were applied based on Horridge et al. (2005) to create TERM’s regional database. Horridge (2000) provides a detailed description of the process that was implemented. In addition to the data presented by the national I-O table, other data on the current account, balance of payments and capital flows were sourced from the South African Reserve Bank (South African Reserve Bank, 2010 - 2018). The National Treasury provided data on the gross national government debt

(National Treasury, 2018). Statistics South Africa also provided national and regional employment data (Statistics South Africa, 2018).

### 3.2 National Industry Adjustments

Before the regional flow database could be constructed, we applied two major adjustments to the national I-O table. First, the original industries were condensed. Second, the government industry was split into three sub-classifications to allow for more accurate fiscal policy analyses.

During the first step the 104 industries presented in StatsSA’s SUTs were condensed into the 30 industries used in TERM-SA. This step was accomplished by using the seventh edition of StatsSA’s Standard Industrial Classification (Statistics South Africa, 2012). The second step involved stripping out the healthcare and education portions from the government industry; in doing so, TERM-SA can differentiate between general government services, government healthcare, as well as government education.

To remove the sub-classifications from the initial government sector we multiplied consolidated government expenditure weightings with the government I-O totals in StatsSA’s SUTs; later studies might consider a more appropriate manner. Consolidated government expenditure weightings were obtained from SA’s National Treasury (National Treasury, 2018); a ten-year average from 2011/12 to 2020/21 was used for each of the sub-classifications. Data showed that healthcare constitutes 17.3% of total consolidated expenditure, education 22.7%, and general or other government services (the residual) 60%<sup>11</sup>. These weightings were then multiplied with the government I-O totals in StatsSA’s SUTs. Using this approach, we were able to compare government’s share of education and healthcare, to that of the private sector. We found that the government sector’s share of total education in SA is roughly 80%, whereas its share of total healthcare is only about 60%.

After we learned which portion of the initial aggregate government industry could be allocated to each sub-classification, we constructed the I-O for government healthcare and education based on the weightings of their private sector counterparts. In doing this, we assumed that government healthcare and education follow similar I-O patterns as their private sector counterparts. Once again, later studies might consider a more accurate approach. After the split and construction of government healthcare and education we had to RAS the original matrix using Horridge (2011)<sup>12</sup>. By applying this data-adjusting technique data integrity is maintained, that is, the macro-economic identities were upheld.

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<sup>11</sup>We include National Treasuries projected figures for 2019/20 and 2020/21 because our aim is to create a long-term projected view of these shares. It is therefore, useful to include some projected figures in our assumption.

<sup>12</sup>RAS is a data-manipulating technique that allows us to target specific row and column totals by using initial table weightings to adjust individual cells in a two-by-two table.

### 3.3 Adding Regionality

After the national input-output (I-O) database was created from StatsSA's SUTs and the industries were adjusted for use by TERM-SA, regionality could be added to the database. To accomplish the task each industry and final demander's share of the national activity is needed. Here, the aim is to create a full I-O table for each region (province) in South Africa. To accomplish this task, the following regional data is needed: industry I-O shares, investment shares, household income and spending shares, import and export shares, as well as government expenditure shares (Horridge, et al., 2005).

The main data source we used for the industry split was unpublished regional I-O tables from StatsSA which were compiled and supplied by Quantec, for 2013 because this is the most recent regional dataset that is available and will therefore, be able to more accurately capture current regional industry weightings. Once again, we are less concerned about absolute values, and more so about relative shares. Relative shares can therefore be used on our updated 2015 dataset. Using the same source, we were able to split the national investment by industry, for each region. Specifically, we used an average of the industry and region-specific gross operating surpluses, as well as data on capital formation. Commodities produced in different provinces are assumed to be similar in the model, so the only reason for prices to differ is the distances that commodities need to be transported. Prices include trade and transport margins, and the further away from a production unit the consumer is, the more she will pay for a good.

Regional household demand data was obtained from StatsSA's regional Income and Expenditure Surveys (Statistics South Africa, 2012). Import and export shares for each airport and harbour, which is needed to compile international trade data by region, was provided by Quantec and the Department of Trade and Investment (DTI). Various distance-related data, that was used to create the *TRADE*-matrix, was provided by Prof. JH van Heerden from the University of Pretoria.

### 3.4 The Regional Government User

Because TERM-SA is designed to address policy questions about the South African economy, and more so because we attempt to find a better fiscal policy alternative, we've increased the accuracy of the regional commodity splits which are applied to the government user. Like most CGE-models, TERM-SA defines the government as both an industry and a final user. The government user demands different commodities, but especially those produced by the three government industries, to satisfy its needs. Government industries however, demand different commodities as inputs, to ultimately produce various government services; general services, healthcare and education. Like other industries modelled in TERM-SA, the government industries' commodity and regional splits are determined by StatsSA's unpublished regional I-O tables, as well as unpublished government expenditure data. In this section we therefore, explain

the process involved with increasing the regional accuracy of the commodities used by the government user.

In older regional CGE-models of South Africa, such as the TERM model used in Stofberg and van Heerden (2015), it was simply assumed that regional government splits follow regional GDP. In TERM-SA however, we use unpublished regional government expenditure data for the 2012/13 fiscal year, provided by the National Treasury to inform us about regional government spending<sup>13</sup>. Published data of this nature only disaggregates government spending on a level of 20 items, which is not enough for the depth of regional-economic and fiscal analysis we want to accomplish with TERM-SA. The unpublished dataset provided us with the lowest level of government spending disaggregation, that is, a disaggregation of 1581 commodities in each of SA’s nine provinces. A more detailed view of the structure of regional government spending ultimately allows for more accurate analysis. To aggregate National Treasury’s 1581 expenditure items for each province into the 30 commodities recognised by TERM-SA, we once again used the seventh edition of StatsSA’s Standard Industrial Classification. Table 1 below illustrates final regional government spending, after the abovementioned changes were made. It should be noted that welfare and other spending are captured by the SAM (see Column 12 “Government” in Table AA). However, in its current set up, TERM-SA only makes provision for a national, and not provincial SAM, in which case we are unable to easily observe how the national government user distributes welfare and other spending to regions. This does not imply that the transfers are not made. As an example, in TERM-SA, the national government makes transfers to different household users, which can then be aggregated on a regional level to determine the amount of regional government transfers to households.

### 3.5 SAM-Database Extension

TERM-SA’s SAM-extension is a square matrix that adheres to double entry accounting. The SAM-database illustrates how incomes (along the rows) are earned and expenditures made (along the columns) by various agents (Corong & Horridge, 2012), within the South African economy. A savings row acts as a residual to allow each row and column total to correspond; here, net savings are the *CAD*, or put differently, the net flows to or from the *RotW*.

Table AA in Appendix A illustrates, TERM-SA’s SAM-database and illustrates the link between the 2011 (updated for 2015 values) core single-region CGE-data (the National I-O Database), and TERM-SA’s SAM-model extension. Core single-region CGE-data are those values not shaded in grey (the first 8 rows), whereas shaded values illustrate the SAM-additions that have been added to TERM-SA. Values for the core database were obtained through the process outlined previously. Weightings for the SAM-extension were however obtained from StatsSA’s National Accounts data (Statistics South Africa,

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<sup>13</sup>Because of the sensitive nature of this data it is not published. Less disaggregated datasets are however, available on the website of the National Treasury of South Africa: <http://www.treasury.gov.za/>.

2016) and from Van Seventer et al. (2016). Both sources focus on the 2012 South African economy and allow us to adjust our 2011 SUT dataset with new weightings. The following section briefly considers some of the important information of the SAM table; Corong and Horridge (2012) provide a full description of each equation.

### 3.6 Capital and Gross Operating Surplus

By using StatsSA’s National Accounts and the relative weights calculated in Van Seventer et al. (2016) we were able to allocate the capital incomes generated by South Africa’s economy (row 5) towards those users who receive them (column 5). Users who receive these incomes include: households, enterprises, government and the rest of the world (foreigners). Although foreigners also earn *GOS* the share of foreign ownership is relatively small and varies considerably between years. In 2009 foreign ownership of *GOS* was 0.09% (Davies & Thurlow, 2013), in 2012 it was 8.1% (Van Seventer, et al., 2016). In 2014 it was 0.00% (Phoofolo, 2018), and in 2016 it was 9.4% (Van Seventer & Davies, 2019). For this reason, and because our aim is to analyse various policies over the long-term, we assumed foreign receipts of *GOS* would average 5% over the simulation period.

### 3.7 Households

Households (Row 10 in Table AA) receive an income from labour and capital, as well as from transfers from enterprises, government (which include interest income) and the rest of the world. Labour income by household is obtained from StatsSA’s (Statistics South Africa, 2012) regional Income and Expenditure (IES) data, pre-built and provided by Quantec, for 2012. We also used data from Van Seventer et al. (2016), who provide invaluable SAM-based estimates on gross operating surplus (*GOS*), transfers from government and the rest of the world (*RotW*), for various household types. Table 2 below indicates each income category’s allocation to each household type.

Column 10 shows the total spending of each household in SA. From the National I-O table data was acquired for each household’s spending on local and imported commodities, as well as commodity-related taxes paid by households. Income taxes levied on labour income by each household, are calculated by using the applicable South African Income Tax Rate, as provided by the South African Revenue Services (SARS).

Household transfers made to the government and the *RotW* (which include interest payments on net-foreign liabilities) are split using data from van Seventer et al. (2016) and where needed savings data from the SARB (South African Reserve Bank, 2018). Household transfers to government include miscellaneous transfers and social contributions (Van Seventer, et al., 2016). Miscellaneous transfers include membership dues, subscriptions, and donations made to non-profit institutions serving households (NPISHs), as well as fines and penalties

paid to government. Social contributions consist of actual or imputed contributions to make provision for social benefits. In SA’s context these include payments made to the unemployment insurance fund (UIF), and the skills development levy (SDL), as two examples. Household transfers to the rest of the world are like the transfers made to enterprises (Van Seventer, et al., 2016) and include property income payable, as well as non-life insurance premiums. More specifically, these transfers include interest on household bonds, contributions to retirement funds, as well as the employer’s contribution thereof. Following van Seventer et al. (2016) we allow transfers which households make to enterprises to follow household spending patterns. Based on the structure of National Accounts the residual of a household’s income and expenditure can then be considered as the household’s savings. Table 2 below indicates each SAM-expenditure category’s allocation to each household type from the poorest to the richest households in SA. Each household type represents a different decile, following IES descriptions, the poorest and richest deciles were then further split into ventiles. Household type 1, therefore represents the poorest 5% of households in SA. Household type 5 represents decile four.

### 3.8 Enterprises

Enterprises in TERM-SA represent all public and private corporations (which include financial and non-financial corporations) in South Africa. This economic user receives an income from capital (*GOS*), as well as transfers from households, government (which include interest earned on debt ownership), and the rest of the world (*RotW*, which include interest payments to foreigners based on their ownership of net foreign liabilities). Once again to split *GOS* between different users we used National Accounts data from StatsSA, as well as user weightings from Van Seventer et al. (2016). Transfers from the government were sourced in a similar manner. Transfers from households were explained above.

Enterprises pay corporate income taxes to government, and make transfers to households, government, and the *RotW* (which include interest payments on net foreign liabilities owned by enterprises). Data sourcing for these expenditure items follows a similar path as those for income items. The residual between income and spending is the savings made by enterprises. In line with the input-data, Table AA shows that enterprises are the largest savers in the South African economy.

### 3.9 Database Calibration

Calibration is a process used in CGE-modelling whereby maximization conditions are used to infer unknown variables or parameters from those that are known. Certain known variables, including elasticities and preference variables, are selected based on literature from sources such as Dixon and Rimmer (2002), Horridge et al. (2005), and Wittwer et al (2005). Other macro-economic variables are sourced from industry experts or assumed based on the modelers’ specific requirements. Another important assumption used during database

calibration is that the number of firms in a specific industry and region, is set equal to one. This simplifying assumption allows the parameter to be used as a relative measure; the assumption holds even when setting the quantity and prices encountered by small firms equal to the summed total in the data. A final important calibration procedure followed in TERM-SA, is calibrating the first modular period, that is, 2015.

## 4 Model Closure

To successfully compute a solution using TERM-SA's system of equations, i.e. to close the model, the number of endogenous variables ( $y$ ), i.e. the dependant variables calculated by the model should equal the number of equations ( $x$ ). To adhere to this requirement,  $(y - x)$  variables must therefore be assumed exogenous, that is, determined outside of the model. Dixon and Rimmer (2002) explain which variables should be exogenized to best describe the economic environment in which the simulation is run. Because our aim is to evaluate the fiscal incidence of a specific government policy, we construct both a baseline and policy closure. It is important to mention that both the baseline and policy simulations that build on these closures are performed as a sequence of annual solutions, and are therefore, short-run in nature. Dixon and Rimmer (2002) note that in these annual solutions, the start-of-year stock variables are determined by end of year stock variables in the baseline. Stock variables in TERM-SA include capital, as well as government and foreign debt. Although start-of-year stock variables are considered exogenous within a year they are endogenous between years.

TERM-SA's baseline closure, follows the guidelines set out in Dixon and Rimmer (2002) and creates a believable business-as-usual picture of the likely evolution of South Africa's economy over multiple years. This is done in such a manner that considers the addition of reliable macro-economic forecast data, and often has little regard for causation. Some other steps in the setup process include creating a short run environment and activating dynamics. These steps are introduced by making use of various swap statements<sup>14</sup> in the GEMPACK software.

Building on the baseline closure, the policy closure allows us to analyse the impact of the suggested policy changes as a percentage deviation away from the baseline. This is done by using swaps between policy-related variables modellers want to change with variables not affected by the policy decision. Policy closures are more conventional because naturally endogenous variables, like components of GPD and employment, are kept endogenous. This conventional route is preferred by modelers because it allows them the opportunity to evaluate the impact of policy changes on key macro-economic variables, but also on disaggregated industry, regional, and household variables. In doing so modelers can

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<sup>14</sup>Swaps are a tool used in GEMPACK to switch the status (exogenous or endogenous) between two variables.

discern possible winners and losers for any imposed policy changes. In our policy simulation, we have assumed that the government deficit remains unchanged between the baseline and policy closures. This assumption is introduced because the objective of our analysis is to find a better alternative for the government's planned expenditure and not to change expenditure levels.

In the policy closure we also introduce the necessary swaps that would later allow us to shock the relevant policy variables. The most important of these is the indirect increase in investment caused by subsidizing the construction industry by the amount of savings that was generated from the decision to keep the government's real wage bill fixed for five years. We've estimated that the savings generated by government can, on average, perpetually increase investments by 3.15%, annually. In this instance, the construction industry is used as a type of proxy for total investment. We believe this is prudent, because according to the Supply-Use Tables (Statistics South Africa, 2016) the construction industry represents 48% of total investments in South Africa. The second largest industry, metal and machinery only represents 21% of the total investments. Also, 78% of the construction industry is used as inputs in creating investment products in the South African economy. Instead of using a conventional manner whereby savings are used to increase government infrastructure spending, the proposed construction industry subsidy is used. Our aim is not to increase government-related infrastructure projects, but rather to increase aggregate investments in South Africa, which include non-infrastructure projects as well. Like Calderón et al. (2015), this is done to reduce the inefficiencies and corruption related to government infrastructure projects.

After the correct closure is applied to TERM-SA, the model is solved by manipulating the linearized data-matrices using GEMPACK software. Although CGE-models contain numerous non-linear equations and relationships, these are simplified by implementing Johansen's (1960) system of linearization<sup>15</sup>. Usually, back of the envelope (BOTE) equations are used to illustrate the nature and direction of regional economic causation in the short and long run. BOTE equations also help to illustrate how different model closures are introduced. However, to save space we rather explain causality and the model closure process where it is needed<sup>16</sup>.

## 5 Baseline and Policy Simulations

The main purpose of TERM-SA is to estimate the impact of economic policies on a variety of macro and micro-economic variables in the South African context. In this instance we reduce the redistributive nature of government's current policy mix. Savings generated from this decision are used to increase spending on wealth creative policies during the same period.

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<sup>15</sup>The linearization process is explained in detail in Dixon and Rimmer (2002).

<sup>16</sup>Giesecke and Madden (2011) provide a detailed explanation about S-BOTE, a stylized representation of reality. Dixon and Rimmer (2002) use BOTE equations to provide a detailed explanation of different model closures used in CGE models like TERM-SA.

In 2018 South Africa’s Minister of Finance, Tito Mboweni, announced during his Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) that South Africa is at a crossroads and that tough decisions must be made (National Treasury, 2018). In 2019, during his annual Budget Speech, he elaborated on this by explaining that the salaries of members of parliament, and those of the directors of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs), will not be increased in nominal terms (National Treasury, 2019). Minister Mboweni also explained that the structure of key SOEs will be changed and to a certain extent, privatised (National Treasury, 2019). Policy statements like these point towards a government that is willing to consider other fiscal policy strategies to create a more prosperous South Africa for all its citizens. We add to this debate through our analysis of an alternative fiscal policy mix.

To do this we first created a 20-year business-as-usual forecast (which we also refer to as the baseline) of the South African economy, from 2015 up to 2035<sup>17</sup>. We then simulate the fiscal policy alternative and consider the impact of a change in government policy on national and provincial macro-economic variables, industries and different household types<sup>18</sup>. The fiscal policy alternative is to freeze the real government wage bill for five years and use the savings to subsidize the production of Construction services, a proxy for Investments. In the model we also keep the government budget deficit fixed on its baseline values; with the labour savings a surplus would occur every year, and we then spend the surplus on Construction services. The results from fiscal policy alternative is measured as a deviation away from the baseline. We also make use of the SAM-extension of TERM-SA to discern a more accurate impact of a change in fiscal policy on the flow of income between various economic agents in the South African economy. TERM-SA is used to simulate both the baseline and policy alternative and is solved using the GEMPACK.

## 6 Results, the deviation away from the Baseline

### 6.1 National Macro-Economic Results

Figure 1 and 2 respectively, show the macro-economic impact of the policy shock on both the supply (income) and demand (expenditure) side of the economy during our simulation. Each graph illustrates these impacts as a percentage deviation away from the baseline. Investment increases via the construction subsidy, which is paid for by the savings generated from keeping the real government wage bill fixed for five years. It is worth noting that the estimated savings, and consequent tax relief in the construction industry is roughly R6.3 billion over the 5-year policy shock period; which is only a fraction (0.14%) of government’s aggregate income over this period.

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<sup>17</sup>Results generated by the baseline forecast simulation are not discussed in this paper but are available upon request.

<sup>18</sup>To save space and because we are more concerned with the deviation away from the baseline, we do not provide the results of the policy simulation.

Higher investment in each period, imply higher levels of capital in each subsequent period. In fact, compared to the baseline capital is cumulatively 8.63% higher at the end of the 20-year policy period (2016 – 2035). Investments are cumulatively 13.20% higher in 2035; illustrated by Figure 2. Although we assume long-run rates of return remain unchanged, labour productivity among government-related industries increased during the policy simulation; this will be discussed later. To facilitate the wage bill shock we endogenized government labour productivity. As a result, the  $K/L$  ratio increases slightly.

In 2035 the total labour input, wage bill weighted, was 1.45% higher in the policy simulation than in the baseline. An alternative measure that considers the amount of jobs that were created is displayed in Figure 1. This measure shows that employment increased by 2.44%, slightly more than the wage bill weighted measure. The reason for this is because the increase in employment is mostly in investment-related industries such as construction, electrical, and glass and non-metals. These industries employ relatively more semi-skilled employees who earn less than skilled workers who are concentrated in South Africa’s service industries. As a result, relatively more employees are employed with the same amount of wage bill increases. In fact, during the policy simulation roughly 160,000 more unskilled, 190,000 more semi-skilled jobs, and 106,000 more skilled jobs are created. In total 456,000 more jobs are created.

During the first 5 years of the policy simulation, we keep the real wage bill of government employees fixed by endogenising their productivity. However, keeping the real wage bill fixed implies a reduction compared to the baseline. To facilitate this reduction, whilst maintaining the government user’s expenditure levels, the productivity of government employees is roughly 1.5% higher during each year of the initial 5-year simulation. To determine if this increase in productivity is acceptable, we turn to research that considers the impact of a decrease in employment protection on labour productivity. Because employment protection impacts labour productivity through multiple mechanisms research findings are often ambiguous. However, the direction and magnitude of seminal research<sup>19</sup> seem to support our findings. However, it might still be better to have future research specific to South Africa substantiate our assumptions. For this reason, it is easier to assume these levels of productivity increases are the level that would be needed to allow the implementation of a policy that would keep the real wage bill of government fixed whilst delivering the same level of services.

Figure 2 illustrates the demand side of the economy and shows that, barring two exceptions, the long-run impact of the policy on aggregate expenditure variables is positive, and of similar magnitude than the overall change in GDP. Government expenditure was exogenously set to remain unchanged between the baseline and policy simulations. Measured against the baseline, cumulative export demand growth in 2035 (6.73%) is slightly greater than overall GDP growth (5.90%), mostly because of the relatively higher export growth during

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<sup>19</sup>These sources include: Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007); Cappellari, Dell’Arlinga and Leonardi (2012); Boedo and Mukoyama (2012); Okudaira, Takizawa and Tsuru (2013), Bjugren (2018),

the initial 5-year policy shock.

Initially the policy shock offered marginal support to exporters. Lower marginal costs and better productivity aids economic performance. A larger economy facilitated by perpetual investment increases supports greater export volumes. Also, without a change in the foreign demand curves (which is assumed exogenous), more exports are accompanied by a fall in the foreign-currency prices of domestically produced commodities. It is important to note that we assume local demand in SA has no effect on import prices. The net-effect is a deteriorating terms of trade<sup>20</sup> of -1.62%, which supports higher export demand by making local products more competitive in global markets.

Imports in TERM-SA are related to the level of GDP, the terms of trade, and import/domestic Armington elasticities. It is therefore, reasonable to assume that imports would grow in line with aggregate economic growth. In fact, cumulative import growth in 2035 is 5.06%, and compares well with aggregate economic growth of 5.90%. Imports could not grow as fast as exports or even GDP because of the deteriorating terms of trade favours locally produced commodities over imports. It is also important to note that in our closure we assumed that the trade balance (exports less imports) would remain unchanged between the baseline and policy simulations.

Figure 2 shows an initial decrease in aggregate household spending that reaches -1.05% in 2020, before starting to recover. At the end of the simulation household spending is 4.76% higher than the baseline case. This initial slump is explained by the assumption that household spending is a function of disposable income. As illustrated in Figure 1 labour income is reduced during the initial 5-year policy shock. However, less labour income and higher levels of net foreign liabilities, amongst others, reduce disposable income which reduce aggregate consumption; more detail is provided in the following section. After the initial policy period, a larger economy implies a greater demand for labour income, illustrated in Figure 1 and consequently more consumption, as illustrated in Figure 2.

## 6.2 Aggregate Prices, the GDP-deflator

Real GDP grew cumulatively by 0.74% during the 5-year policy period and the GDP-deflator decreased cumulatively by -2.82% in 2020, causing a reduction in nominal GDP of -2.10%. In 2035, measured against the baseline, real GDP is 5.90% higher and the GDP-deflator is -5.08% lower; nominal GDP is therefore only 0.53% higher than the baseline. Aggregate prices remained under pressure throughout the simulation period. To explain the fall seen in the GDP deflator it is worthwhile to mention that the deflator can be expressed as the weighted sum of user (industries, government, investors households, and exporters) prices in the South African economy. Also, it is important to consider the nature of our policy shock that increases investment perpetually over the simulation period. More productive capacity cause prices to decrease relative to the baseline, or

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<sup>20</sup>The price of exports relative to the price of imports.

put differently, prices will be rising at a slower rate.

Investment prices also fall by a relatively large amount compared to other price changes (-9.56% in 2035), because of lower taxes and a lower cost of production, driven by lower input costs. Subsidising the construction industry to facilitate higher levels of Investment reduces the final price Investors must pay. Additionally, the basic price of investors is reduced by lower costs of labour and capital in those industries which provide input to investors. Also, relatively higher levels of investments lead to a higher capital-labour ratio, which in turn, reduces the marginal product of capital and thereby the rental price of capital. In the end the price of investments is cumulatively reduced by -3.91% during the 5-year policy period.

The price of investment is set to fall faster than the price of capital, as the rate of return on capital increases over time. Our results showed that, measured against the baseline, the price of capital fell cumulatively by -7.16%. Consequently, compared to the baseline, the rate of return on capital gradually increased from -0.28% in 2016 to 0.75% in 2035. It is important to note that the price of labour increases as the demand for labour increases, to facilitate greater levels of productive capacity. However, the fall in capital prices (-7.16%) more than offset the increase in labour prices (2.03%). As a result, the cost of production decreased, which in turn reduced the prices users pay for commodities.

Initially household (consumer) prices fell cumulatively by -0.91% in 2020 as a result of the decline in demand, caused by the fall in income. After the policy period household spending stabilised and started to increase as labour income grew in line with a faster growing economy. At this point the prices households pay for various commodities were reduced relative to the baseline. Or put differently, prices increased at a slower rate, because a lower cost of production kept commodity prices low. At the end, household prices were reduced by -2.43%, measured against the baseline.

Export prices fell (cumulatively by -1.62% in 2035) and import prices were left unchanged (assumed exogenous). Because spending of the Government user was set exogenous demand was not the driver of lower government prices. The price index paid by the government user is obtained through a weighted average of the purchases made by this user. The bulk of commodity purchases made by this user are general government services, government education, and government healthcare services; these represent 67.2%, 20.1% and 12.7% of the user's total purchases, respectively. Our policy shock reduces the (basic) price of (labour) inputs. The users who purchase the largest share of various government services (i.e. the government user) will therefore experience the largest decrease in prices. In fact, the cumulative price decreases experienced by the government user in 2020 was -6.69%. After the initial policy period and measured against the baseline the wage bill starts to recover back to pre-policy levels. This in turn, causes the government price index to increase, but not fast enough to offset the reduction caused by the policy. In the end, compared to the baseline, the government's price index is cumulatively -5.69% lower in 2035.

### 6.3 Industries

Industry growth is driven by macro-economic growth and changes that were brought about by policy shocks. During the simulation period, 2016-2035, more investment favoured the construction, electrical, as well as glass and non-metals industries. Measured against the baseline, these industries experienced a 14.28%, 12.12%, and 12.2% increase in output, respectively. It is important to recall that our policy shock increase investment through a subsidy in the construction industry that supply 78% of their output to investors. The closest comparison is the 33% of all electrical commodities that are supplied to investors. Because the bulk of these two industries are used by investors, they experience substantial output increases, relative to the baseline. The glass and non-metals industry experience a similar increase in output, but for somewhat different reasons. Instead of supplying the bulk of its output to investors, the glass and non-metals industry supply the bulk (51%) of their output to the construction industry. Additionally, the glass and non-metals industry supply 4.4% to the fast-growing export sector and 9.9% is used by the industry itself; growth in the sector therefore supports further growth.

Industries who experienced the smallest output increases were those industries who supply their output to the government user. These industries are most notably the three government industries: general government, education, and healthcare who contribute 82.9%, 82.0%, and 82.3% of their output to the government user, respectively. Because we kept the government user's spending and deficit unchanged between the baseline and policy simulation, government industries that supply services to this user will therefore have limited output potential beyond baseline levels. As a result, the three industries grew by 0.40%, 0.87%, and 1.54%, respectively. The reason the government's education industry experienced a greater increase is because this industry provides the least amount of its output to the other slower growing government industries.

Following the government industries, the food and beverages, as well as textile and footwear industries experienced the smallest output increases, 4.53% and 4.23%, respectively. The reason for these muted increases is because these two sectors supply the largest share of their output to households, 71.3% and 63.5%, respectively. Compared to any other industry these industries provide the largest share of their output to households who experienced the smallest increase (4.76%) among macro-economic expenditure variables.

The reason the real estate industry was able to grow at 7.65% despite providing 60.4% to the household user, is because 6.9% of its output is supplied to investors. Also, the real estate industry supplies 10.3% of its output to the trade industry, which facilitates trade between industries and other users. As the economy grows 5.90% faster in the policy simulation, the trade industry also grows faster, which ultimately benefits the real estate industry. But most importantly is the nature of household demand. The bulk of real estate services (70.3%) is purchased by the wealthiest 5% of households who experienced the greatest increase in disposable income and increases in spending. Furthermore, 34% of all their income is spent on real estate commodities, 7.3% is spent on

food and beverages and only 1.0% is spent on textiles and footwear. Poorer households, spend a much larger portion of their slower growing income, compared to richer households, on food and beverages and textiles and footwear. That is, the poorest 5% of households spend 38.5% on food and beverages, 2.3% on textiles and footwear, and only 0.9% on real estate.

Another industry that does relatively well is the hotel and accommodation industry that experienced cumulative growth of 9.05% after the introduction of the policy shock. Hotels and accommodation are used most notably by households (40.1%) and foreigners (34.5%). However, the bulk of household demand for hotels and accommodation (61.3%) is imported, meaning that households only demand 35.6% of South Africa's hotel and accommodation industry. For this reason, is the relatively lower demand growth from households offset by higher foreign demand for services rendered by the hotel and accommodation industry. A fall in South Africa's terms of trade (-1.62%) implies that South Africa's products become relatively more competitive, fuelling foreign demand.

#### 6.4 Households: Income, Spending and Savings

Aggregate household spending can be expressed as a function of the average propensity of households to consume their disposable income. Changes in aggregate household income therefore explain changes in aggregate household consumption. Disposable income, in turn, is the sum of all sources of household income in an economy, minus payments made to the rest of the world and taxes paid to the government. Building on this, TERM-SA's SAM-capabilities allow us to model an elaborate definition of household income and spending. Income can be defined as the sum of: labour income, household's share of gross operating surplus, as well as transfers from enterprises, the government and the rest of the world.

Based on South Africa's supply-use tables (Van Seventer, et al., 2016) income from labour (the wage bill) constitutes 53.9% of total household income. Transfers from enterprises contribute 19.4% to total household income, and a household's share of gross operating surplus (*GOS*) contributes 14.9% to the total income. Transfers from government contribute 11.3% (which include interest income on debt owned by households), and transfers from the Rest of the World (*RotW*) contribute 0.4%. Disposable income can then be obtained by subtracting taxes, household transfers to government, and interest payments to foreigners, from total income. Total household taxes (income and consumption taxes) represent 16% of aggregate income whereas transfers to the government represent 7% of total income. Interest payments to foreigners are only 0.11% of total income. To estimate the savings of each household type, household spending, as well as transfers to enterprises and the *RotW*, are subtracted from each household type. Transfers to enterprises represent 8.0% of total household income and transfers to the *RotW* only 0.1%.

## 6.5 Aggregate Household Income

Keeping the real wage bill of government employees fixed during the 5-year policy period reduces the cumulative nation-wide real wage bill by -1.53%, relative to the baseline. However, measured against the baseline the wage bill is cumulatively 4.46% higher in 2035. Transfers which households receive from enterprises are cumulatively increased by 0.52% during the initial policy period and 3.38% higher at the end of the simulation; we assume enterprise transfers grow in-line with post-tax enterprise income. Initially household income from *GOS* increased cumulatively by 1.30% but ends 3.83% higher than the baseline in 2035; driven by growth in aggregate payments to capital and land. Transfers from the *RotW* and government are assumed to grow in-line with nominal GDP, and both decreased cumulatively by -1.18% by 2020. By the end of the simulation period, transfers from government and the *RotW* are 2.96% higher than the baseline.

Measured against the baseline, the interest rate earned on government debt, decreased cumulatively by -13.87% over the initial 5-year policy period. The reason for this relatively large fall is because of our model assumptions. TERM-SA follows the example of other regional dynamic models like USAGE-TERM, and VERM and link interest rates to inflation and changes in government debt, both of which fall during the policy period. As both debt and inflation (the prices households pay) fall, interest rates also fall. Also, debt decreases during the policy period because nominal GDP grows faster than the deficit/debt ratio. After the policy period interest rates continue to increase, but at a slower rate as the rate of inflation and growth in debt also increase at slower rates.

By summing the different sources of household income, real aggregate household income decreased by -1.53% during the initial 5-year policy period but increased to 4.46% above the baseline in 2035. On closer inspection richer households experienced a smaller decline in their real incomes during the policy shock and later enjoy greater increases as the simulation reaches and end. Measured against the baseline the poorest households (the 1<sup>st</sup> ventile among household-types) experienced a -1.29% real decrease in their income, whereas the richest households (20<sup>th</sup> ventile) only experienced a -0.31% decrease, during the policy period. By the end of the simulation the poorest ventile experience a 3.79% increase in real income, and the richest households a 4.69% increase.

Compared to poorer households, wealthier households derive a larger share of their income from *GOS* and transfers from enterprises, which were the only two sources of household income that saw growth during the 5-year policy-period; 1.30% and 0.52% respectively. At the end of the simulation *GOS* and transfers from enterprises experience the second and third largest increases among household income sources, 3.83% and 3.38% respectively; at this stage growth in labour income (wages) was higher at 4.57%. The richest households receive 20% of their income from *GOS* and 31% from enterprise-transfers, compared to 2% and 1% for the poorest households. Poorer households derive the bulk of their income from the government, via transfers, which, measured against the baseline, saw the largest contraction (-1.18%) during the policy period. In fact,

poor households receive 65% of their income via government transfers, compared to the richest households who only receive 2% of their total income in the form of government transfers. Only after the initial 5-year policy shock do transfers from government start to increase and measured against the baseline cumulatively increases by 2.96% in 2035.

In addition to these household-specific differences that occur within various income sources, labour income between different household types also differ. During the 5-year policy period the poorest 5% of households (1<sup>st</sup> ventile) experienced a cumulative labour-income decrease of -1.36%, measured against the baseline. This compares well to the richest 5% (20<sup>th</sup> ventile) of households who experienced a -1.43% reduction. However, some larger variations were seen among the 2<sup>nd</sup> decile and 9<sup>th</sup> decile households, the best and worst performing households, respectively. Labour-income in these households were reduced by -0.91% and -1.71%, respectively. To understand these differences, it is important to consider the impact of the 5-year wage-bill policy shock on the wage bills and output of various industries.

We've explained the relatively slower growth in the various government industries: general government services (GS), government education (GE), and government healthcare (GH). Relatively slower growth, in addition to the outright reduction in wages and employment led to a wage bill reduction of -9.55% in GS, and -9.24% in both GE and GH industries. In contrast, higher output growth in the construction, electrical, and glass and non-metals' industries led to a wage bill increase of 9.93%, 6.48%, and 5.41%, respectively. In TERM-SA we differentiate household labour income by household-type, province, and occupation. To determine the impact of labour income on different household-types, it is therefore important to consider the impact of the beforementioned on different occupations. The three government industries collectively employ 47% of all "service workers and shop and market sales workers" (*srv*), and "domestic workers" (*dwk*). These industries also employ 45% of all "unclassified" (*usf*) workers and 38% of all "professionals" (*prf*). This explains the relatively large real wage bill reductions in these occupations; -3.73% (*srv*), -3.61% (*dwk*), -3.42% (*usf*), -2.71% (*prf*).

In contrast, government industries demand the least amount of "craft and related trades workers" (*crf*), "operators and assemblers" (*opr*), "elementary workers" (*elt*), and to a lesser extent "senior officials and managers" (*leg*). As a percentage of total industry employment, the three government industries collectively employ 9% (*crf*), 10% (*opr*), 18% (*elt*), and 21% (*leg*) of the workers in these occupations. The construction industry however employs 11% of all *crf* workers and 9% of all *elt* workers. Although their contribution to aggregate employment is small (0.9%, wage bill weighted), the glass and non-metals and electrical industries employ relatively more *crf* and *opr* worker. As a share of their total employment both the glass and non-metals and electrical industries employ 13% *crf* workers and 9% *opr*. In the end, the relatively small demand government industries have for these occupations, in addition to the relatively large demand the faster growing industries have for them, explains the growth in their wage bills; *crf* (1.42%), *opr* (0.54%), and *elt* (0.28%). As a share of

total employment *leg* workers have a relatively small exposure to government industries (21%), but they also have a relatively small exposure to fast growing industries (4%). However, it should be noted that *leg* workers represent a relatively large share of the total employment in each of the fast-growing industries; 29% in the electrical and glass and non-metals, and 26% in the construction industry. As a result, the real wage bill of *leg* workers was reduced by -0.62%.

Among the poorest 5% (first ventile) of households 52% are employed in those occupations that experienced the greatest increase in labour income growth during the 5-year wage bill policy shock. Their exposure to this group of fast-growing industries is the second greatest level of exposure among all household-types; 15% are employed as *crf*, 18% as *opr*, 20% as *elt* workers. However, poor households also have a large (44%) exposure to those occupations that experienced the largest decrease in labour income; 26% are employed as *dwk*, 11% as *usf* and 7% as *srv*. The net effect was a -1.36% reduction in labour income among the poorest households in South Africa. In contrast, the 2<sup>nd</sup> decile households experienced the smallest decrease in labour income, -0.91%, most notably because this group has the largest exposure (56%) to occupations who experienced fast-growing income growth. However, unlike the first ventile group, this group only has a 38% exposure to those occupations that experienced the greatest decrease in labour income. The 9<sup>th</sup> decile household group experienced the greatest decline in labour income, -1.71%. Not only do they have a 43% exposure to occupations that experience the greatest decrease in labour income, but they also only have a 7% exposure to occupations that experienced the greatest increase in labour income. The richest ventile (5%) of households experienced a similar decrease in labour income as that of the poorest ventile, namely -1.43%. But this is largely because 54% are employed as *leg* workers and 23% are employed as *prf* workers, both of which experienced a decrease in their wage bills; -0.68%, and -2.71%, respectively.

At the end of the simulation, the same occupations who experienced the highest cumulative growth and greatest cumulative contraction in their real wage bill in 2020, where once again the fastest and slowest growing occupations in 2035. Like before, the poorest ventile households still experience a similar real increase in labour income (6.03%), compared to that of the richest ventile households (6.13%), in 2035. However, the 9<sup>th</sup> decile households are no longer the worst performing households, but the 7<sup>th</sup> decile households are. Relative to the baseline the 9<sup>th</sup> decile households see an increase of 5.67% compared to the 5.75% increase experienced by households in the 7<sup>th</sup> decile. The reason this occurred is because the 7<sup>th</sup> decile households have a greater exposure (26%) to the three worst performing occupations, compared to the 18% exposure of the 9<sup>th</sup> decile households. What remains unchanged is that the 2<sup>nd</sup> decile households still experience the best performing wage bill changes, 6.65% in 2035.

## 6.6 Disposable Income, Spending and Savings

Disposable household income in TERM-SA is obtained by subtracting taxes, household transfers to government, as well as interest payments on net foreign

liabilities, from aggregate household income. It is however, worth noting that household taxes (income and consumption taxes) and transfers to government represent 16% and 7% of aggregate income, respectively. Interest payments on net foreign debt however only represent 0.11% of total household income. In TERM-SA we assume that changes in nominal taxes and household transfers to government follow nominal changes in household income, adjusted for possible changes in household taxes. Interest payments on foreign debt are calculated like interest payments made by the government to households and enterprises. After considering that these expense items in total, only account for 23.11% of total income, and grow at a similar or slower rate than income, their weighted growth is less than that of income. For this reason, do we see that disposable income increases relatively faster than income, measured against the baseline.

SAM-data shows that the poorest (1<sup>st</sup> ventile) households only pay 0.001% of aggregate transfers to government. The 5<sup>th</sup> decile, richest and second richest households pay 2%, 22%, and 33%, respectively (Van Seventer, et al., 2016). Additionally, the poorest ventile households only pay 0.02% of all household taxes, the 5<sup>th</sup> decile households pay 1%, but the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> ventile households pay 15% and 49%, respectively. We assume that households own foreign debt in the same proportion as they own government debt, which we allocate to households according to IES savings data (Statistics South Africa, 2012). In doing so the poorest households only pay 5% of the interest owed on net foreign debt whereas the richest two ventiles pay 16% and 20%, respectively. Measured against the baseline the poorest households experienced a nominal increase of 1.36% in the transfers they make to the government. The 5<sup>th</sup> decile households experienced a 2.51% increase, whereas the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> ventile households experienced a 2.15% and 2.26% increase, respectively. Following our assumption taxes grow at similar rate than household transfers to government, i.e. the rate at which income grows adjusted for possible tax shocks. For simplicity we've assumed that the same interest rate is paid by all households, in which case the growth in interest rates will also be similar as they are impacted by similar levels of inflation and changes in debt. Household disposable income is calculated by subtracting these values from aggregate household income, and because their relative growth is less, disposable income therefore increases. Measured against the baseline, the poorest (1<sup>st</sup> ventile) households experience a 1.41% increase in their disposable income. The 5<sup>th</sup> decile households experience a 2.54% increase and the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> ventile households experience a 2.17% and 2.28% increase, respectively. In real terms these increases are: 3.84% (1<sup>st</sup> ventile), 4.97% (5<sup>th</sup> decile), 4.60% (19<sup>th</sup> ventile), and 4.71% (20<sup>th</sup> ventile), respectively. We assume households experience similar levels of price changes, namely -2.43%<sup>21</sup>.

Based on the household-specific increases in real disposable income, which drives household spending, the poorest ventile households experienced a 3.84% increase in spending. Measured against the baseline the richest 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> ventile households experienced spending increases of 4.60% and 4.71%, respec-

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<sup>21</sup>For consistency with previous interpretations the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> decile households experienced real labour increases of 4.51% and 4.94% in 2035; measured against the baseline.

tively, and 5<sup>th</sup> decile households experience increases of 4.97%. Finally, household savings is the residual after subtracting spending, as well as household transfers to enterprises and the *RotW*, from disposable income<sup>22</sup>. It is possible that a specific household spends more than its income, in which case a dissaving occurs. To model this dissaving in TERM-SA, considering our interest in deviations away from the baseline, savings are not reported in percentage change terms. Instead we measure the difference ( $SAV_t - SAV_{t-1}$ ) in savings between different years. Figure 3 in turn, illustrates the annual difference in savings between the base and policy simulations. These results have shown that savings among the poorest ventile households are 1.93% higher in 2035 compared to the baseline. The 5<sup>th</sup> decile household saw an increase in savings of 4.59% and the richest 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> ventile households experienced increases of 3.46% and 5.58%, respectively.

## 6.7 Regional Economic Impact

It is important to note that the structure and characteristics of each region influences the results generated by TERM-SA. One of these characteristics is that GP provides the bulk of South Africa’s economic activity, followed by Western Cape (WC) and Kwazulu-Natal (KZN). Figure 4 however shows that, measured against the baseline, North West (NW) experienced the greatest increase in economic activity over our simulation period. Cumulatively real GDP is 7.20% higher in NW at the end of the simulation, 2035. The Northern Cape (NC) saw the second greatest cumulative increase in output, 7.10%. Growth in WC and GP was 6.06% and 6.14% higher, respectively. The worst performing regions were the Mpumalanga (MP) and the Free State (FS) where real growth was only 4.22% and 4.31% higher in the policy simulation. Regional output differences can be explained by the difference in output prices which drive output differences. Relatively lower prices in NW and NC caused output to increase relatively more in this province compared to others. Among final users the cumulative average regional price at households, investors, government, and exporters decreased by: -2.39%, -9.53%, -5.77% and -1.6%, respectively. Although household prices in NW was slightly higher than the regional average (-2.38%), investor prices were slightly lower (-9.59%). However, government (-7.40%) and export (-2.88%) prices were considerably lower. Although price deviations between the regional average and LP, GP and WC, are not as severe as with NW and NC, a similar trend is evident. In aggregate prices decreased by -5.48% in NW. Which is relatively greater than decreases in FS (-3.79%) and MP (-3.90%).

Following relatively lower prices in specific regions output growth was also relatively higher in these regions. This can also be seen in various industries in specific regions. As an example, construction grew 16.20% in NC, the highest among all provinces, but only 13.47% in FS and 12.74% in MP, the slowest growing among provinces. A similar trend is seen in the electrical, glass and

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<sup>22</sup>In TERM-SA we assume household transfers to enterprises grow at the same rate as household gross operating surpluses. Also, we assume household transfers to the rest of the world grow at the same rate as disposable income.

non-metals, real estate and hotel and accommodation industries. Although the NW saw the second greatest increase among these faster growing industries, they experienced the greatest increase in output among slower growing regions, which caused final output growth to be slightly higher in the NW (7.20%), compared to the NC (7.10%). Because our policy shock was not region-specific but rather to find a better fiscal policy alternative for growth and job creation there are no other important regional variables that are worth reporting. TERM-SA does however, allow for in-depth regional analysis.

## 6.8 Other Macros

Driven by greater income growth from *GOS* and lower production costs, enterprises were able to save 2.96% more relatively to the baseline in 2035. We've explained why export and import volumes increased, but also why the terms of trade deteriorated. However, the total income earned by foreigners (the *RotW*, row 16 in Table AA), increased by 4.26%. Put differently, this can also be viewed as all payments made by South Africans to the rest *RotW*. Total receipts from the rest of the world (column 16 in Table AA), increased by 4.87%. For this reason, the current account deficit (*CAD*) deteriorated somewhat from -3.4% in 2016 to -4.6% in 2035, expressed as a percentage of GDP. As the *CAD* deteriorates net foreign liabilities increase from 22% in 2016 to 75% in 2035, expressed as a percentage of GDP. However, these increases are a result of the model's debt-accumulation setup and the assumption that inflation is zero<sup>23</sup>. If we assume inflation is 4.5%, net foreign liabilities would only be 47% in 2035.

## 7 Conclusion and Future Research

Our aim was to find a better alternative to government's current redistributive fiscal policy mix, one that would lead to greater levels of economic and social development in South Africa. To do this we first showed that the government's current policy mix does not lead to sustainable levels of output in the long-term, most notably because of low levels of government productivity. Our findings are supported by earlier work done by Akanbi (2013), Mabugu et al. (2013), and Jooste et al. (2013). Inchauste et al. (2015) also explained that because of the lack of economic growth, high fiscal deficits and the rising cost of debt, further social development will not be possible via redistributive policies. The South African government has in fact, overextended the period of stimulus as Jooste et al. (2013) warned against. From this, and the research done by Alm & Abel (2010) and Odhiambo (2015), we showed that Wagner's Law is a more likely fit for South Africa's structurally constrained economy (Akanbi, 2013).

Keeping to Wagner's Law and following the advice given by Fedderke et al. (2006), Du Plessis and Smit (2006), Mabugu et al. (2013) and Jooste et al. (2013), we suggest a fiscal policy alternative that focuses on wealth creating

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<sup>23</sup>This is a standard assumption in CGE-models and is implemented because we are more concerned with price deviations than absolute changes in prices.

policies. Specifically, we suggest keeping the real government wage bill fixed for five years and using the savings generated by this decision to subsidize the construction industry that could indirectly increase investments. Our suggestion to keep real wages fixed supports the recent announcements made by the Minister of Finance, Tito Mboweni, in his MTBPS (National Treasury, 2018) and annual Budget Speech (National Treasury, 2019). Although his radical statements would keep the nominal wages of certain government employees fixed. To keep to the advice of Calderón et al. (2015) we allow investments to increase through a subsidy rather than simply increasing the government's investment expenditure. In doing so our aim is to reduce the inefficiencies and corruption related to government infrastructure projects. A subsidy also complies with Akanbi (2013) who noted that tax-related fiscal policies will be more effective in South Africa's structurally constrained economy.

To measure the impact of our policy alternative against a likely business-as-usual case we developed a regional, dynamic CGE model, TERM-SA. Our results showed that our suggested fiscal policy alternative would increase aggregate investments cumulatively by 13.20% in 2035. South Africa's GDP would also be 5.90% larger and roughly 456,000 more jobs would have been created. The poorest households (3.94%) experienced a somewhat smaller increase in their disposable income compared to the richest households (4.71%). One might therefore, argue that the policy leads to greater levels of inequality. However, if the suggested policy was not introduced all South Africans would have been poorer and fewer jobs would be available. Future research can consider additional policies that can redistribute the wealth more appropriately.

In our analysis we only kept the government wage bill fixed for 5-years. Future studies might consider keeping a larger portion of unproductive expenditure, like government transfers to households, fixed for a certain period. In doing so a larger portion could be allocated towards productive, wealth enhancing policies. More controversial studies might follow the suggestion made by Finance Minister Tito Mboweni and reduce the real wage bill (National Treasury, 2018). Another study might consider an alternative fiscal policy mix that increases the output efficiencies of education and healthcare in South Africa. These wealth creative policies might contribute to total factor productivity and thereby reduce the debt-burden whilst increasing economic and social development. Future research might also consider subsidising more of the industries that supply to investors. In our analysis we assumed that the government deficit and spending remained unchanged between the baseline and forecast closures. Upcoming research might allow these variables to change over time and permit alternative uses of government finances. To keep the government's real wage bill fixed for five years labour productivity was endogenized, and therefore, measured against the baseline, increased annually by roughly 1.5%. It might be fruitful to use TERM-SA's historical and decomposition closures to determine if this is a probable assumption.

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
**Table 1: Regional Government Spending**

Commodity, Province	Limpopo	North West	Mpulanga	Gauteng	Free State	Nothern Cape	Western Cape	Eastern Cape	KwaZulu-Natal	Total
1 Agric	12%	6%	7%	24%	7%	2%	7%	10%	24%	100%
2 Coal	11%	6%	8%	21%	7%	3%	10%	13%	21%	100%
3 Gold	11%	6%	8%	21%	7%	3%	10%	13%	21%	100%
4 Other_Mining	12%	7%	8%	18%	6%	5%	9%	15%	20%	100%
5 Food_Bev	11%	5%	9%	20%	6%	3%	11%	16%	19%	100%
6 Text_Foot	6%	4%	13%	25%	4%	2%	16%	8%	21%	100%
7 Wood_Paper	13%	10%	14%	10%	9%	3%	9%	14%	18%	100%
8 Petro_Chem	10%	5%	8%	16%	8%	3%	8%	16%	26%	100%
9 Glass_No_Met	8%	9%	5%	44%	5%	1%	7%	9%	11%	100%
10 Metal_Mach	10%	8%	7%	15%	5%	3%	12%	12%	27%	100%
11 Electrical	15%	7%	7%	18%	7%	3%	13%	11%	21%	100%
12 Radio_TV	4%	3%	4%	64%	3%	1%	5%	6%	9%	100%
13 Trans_Equip	24%	4%	9%	10%	11%	3%	4%	8%	27%	100%
14 Other_Manuf	7%	6%	6%	23%	8%	2%	12%	11%	24%	100%
15 Electricity	10%	6%	6%	15%	5%	2%	18%	15%	21%	100%
16 Water	11%	6%	8%	19%	6%	3%	15%	13%	21%	100%
17 Construction	4%	4%	6%	16%	3%	3%	7%	17%	40%	100%
18 Trade	10%	7%	8%	22%	11%	2%	6%	14%	21%	100%
19 Hotels	17%	6%	11%	13%	4%	3%	7%	11%	27%	100%
20 Trans_Serv	11%	8%	8%	18%	7%	4%	10%	15%	20%	100%
21 Comm	11%	8%	9%	16%	7%	3%	10%	16%	20%	100%
22 Financial	9%	5%	6%	13%	29%	2%	8%	12%	16%	100%
23 Real_Estate	15%	6%	6%	16%	5%	9%	8%	12%	24%	100%
24 Business	10%	7%	7%	19%	6%	3%	11%	15%	22%	100%
25 Gov_Gen	10%	6%	7%	27%	7%	3%	9%	14%	17%	100%
26 Gov_Educ	10%	7%	8%	19%	7%	3%	11%	17%	18%	100%
27 Gov_Health	9%	8%	8%	28%	5%	3%	15%	10%	14%	100%
28 Health_Soc	9%	8%	8%	28%	5%	3%	15%	10%	14%	100%
29 Education	10%	7%	8%	19%	7%	3%	11%	17%	18%	100%
30 Other_Serv	9%	8%	7%	20%	7%	4%	9%	16%	21%	100%
<b>Average (weighted)</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>35%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>14%</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>17%</b>	


**Table 2: Household Weights**

Household type, by decile	Labour Income	Gross Operating Surplus	Household Transfers from		Income Tax Paid to Government	Household Transfers to		Transfers to and from RotW to Households
			Government	Enterprises		Government	Enterprises	
1	1.0%	0.2%	10.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0%	5.0%
2	1.5%	0.3%	13.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0%	3.6%
3	2.4%	0.7%	13.2%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0%	4.5%
4	3.1%	1.0%	12.9%	0.6%	0.2%	0.3%	0%	4.7%
5	4.1%	1.4%	12.0%	1.0%	0.7%	1.0%	1%	6.2%
6	5.6%	2.3%	8.8%	2.2%	1.1%	1.5%	2%	6.3%
7	7.8%	3.6%	8.1%	3.6%	2.9%	3.4%	3%	6.3%
8	11.9%	7.1%	6.4%	7.5%	7.6%	8.9%	9%	7.7%
9	21.3%	22.5%	6.3%	17.2%	17.3%	23.6%	24%	6.9%
10	6.3%	6.4%	3.0%	6.6%	6.5%	9.3%	9%	12.4%
11	12.7%	20.3%	2.0%	19.1%	14.7%	22.3%	22%	16.0%
12	22.2%	34.2%	4.3%	41.6%	48.8%	29.5%	30%	20.4%


**Figure 1: Supply Side GDP (% deviation from the Baseline)**




**Figure 2: Demand Side GDP (% deviation from the Baseline)**



**Figure 3: Household Savings (annual differences between years)**



**Figure 4: Regional Economic Growth (cumulative %)**



**Appendix A**  
**Table AA: TERM-SA's SAM-Database**

R'millions		1 Industries	2 Domestic Commodities	3 Imported Commodities	4 Labour	5 Capital	6 Production Taxes	7 Commodity Tax	8 Tariff	9 Direct Tax	10 Households	11 Enterprises	12 Government	13 Government Investment	14 Private Investment	15 Stocks	16 Rest of the World	17 Total	
	Dimension	IND	COM	COM	OCC	CAP	1	1	COM	1	HOU	1	1	IND	IND		1	1	
1 Industries	IND		R 5,908,949																R 5,908,949
2 Domestic Commodities	COM	R 2,592,248									R 1,389,193		R 627,873	R 15,317	R 390,158	-R 3,428	R 897,589		R 5,908,949
3 Imported Commodities	COM	R 521,281									R 216,623		R 0	R 5,473	R 139,414				R 882,791
4 Labour	OCC	R 1,321,802																	R 1,321,802
5 Capital + LND	CAP	R 1,272,533																	R 1,272,533
6 Production Taxes	1	R 40,696																	R 40,696
7 Commodity Tax	1	R 160,389									R 137,308								R 297,697
8 Tariff	COM			R -															R -
9 Direct Tax	1										R 255,482	R 164,303							R 419,785
10 Households	HOU				R 1,321,802	R 364,911						R 475,756	R 277,148					R 11,000	R 2,450,618
11 Enterprises	1					R 842,460					R 193,191		R 259,093					R -	R 1,294,744
12 Government	1					R 65,163	R 40,696	R 297,697	R -	R 419,785	R 169,420	R 147,150						R 2,000	R 1,141,912
13 Government Investment	1												R 20,790						R 20,790
14 Savings	1										R 86,665	R 416,174	-R 102,645					R 125,950	R 526,143
15 Stocks	IND														-R 3,428				-R 3,428
16 Rest of the World	1			R 882,791							R 2,735	R 91,361	R 59,652						R 1,036,539
17 Total	1	R 5,908,949	R 5,908,949	R 882,791	R 1,321,802	R 1,272,533	R 40,696	R 297,697	R -	R 419,785	R 2,450,618	R 1,294,744	R 1,141,912	R 20,790	R 526,143	-R 3,428	R 1,036,539		

Note: Shaded cells indicate additional data from the SAM-database (i.e. not found in the National CGE-database).

Legend: IND – number of industries (30); COM – number of commodities (30); OCC – number of occupations (11), CAP – types of Capital; HOU – number of households (12).